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THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
George W. Dent, Jr.t
Technological innovation and globalization have led to a pro-
liferation of strategic alliances. However, many business people
are still skeptical about the role of lawyers in strategic alliances.
Business people often feel that lawyers are deal breakers, not
dealmakers. Jim Freund, who has written a lot about negotiations,
says that business people rail at the negative attitudes lawyers ex-
hibit, such as seeing a problem behind every bush, overcompensat-
ing to avoid risk, and generating conflict.'
Also, business people often fault lawyers for failing to under-
stand the client's business needs and objectives. This problem is
especially acute in the context of strategic alliances. In many
transactions, the business goal of the client is pretty obvious. In a
strategic alliance, however, it is much less obvious because there
are number of reasons why a client might enter into an alliance: a
client might want to develop a particular product or develop
knowledge of technology in a particular field; a client may be
looking to commence what it hopes will be a growing relationship
with a partner to establish a presence in an industry; or a client
may be looking to an acquisition down the road. Since the range
of goals in a strategic alliance is quite broad, lawyers need to pay
attention to their client and to the business context of the transac-
tion.
To be fair, some of the fault lies with clients. First, they
sometimes discuss deals at a level of glittering generalities until
the lawyers arrive and start raising tough questions: What if the
alliance terminates; what happens then? The parties fall to squab-
bling, the deal falls apart and they say, "Oh gee. Things were go-
ing so well until the lawyers came here and messed it up." Of
course the problem was that the lawyers raised the tough issues
that the parties themselves had not bothered to address.
Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Business Organizations Law, School of Law, Case
Western Reserve University.
1 JAMES FREUND, SMART NEGOTIATING: HOW TO MAKE GOOD DEALS IN THE REAL
WORLD 186 (1992).
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Also, some of the fault for the lawyers' failure to understand
the business context of the transaction and the goals of the client
rest with the client. The client needs to consult with and discuss
these issues with the lawyer since that's the only way the lawyer
can know what the client's goals are. Ed Bernstein has written
about how lawyers can take the blame if clients suffer a loss from
an event for which the lawyers did not draft.2 There have been
some suggestions that often parties do not want a complex detailed
contract. They want a simpler contract because they don't want
the hard bargaining that will erode trust, and they also want to
maintain flexibility, which is understandable. On the other hand,
the lawyer who drafts the contract may realize that if the contract
does not cover some point and later the lack of a term becomes the
cause of conflict, everyone is going to blame the lawyer.
So what do you do as the lawyer if the parties are asking you
to draft a flexible, simpler contract, but if you leave something out,
they are going to blame you for it? First, some background before
discussing how to tackle this problem: I mentioned earlier the tra-
ditional dichotomy that if you need goods or services you either
buy them or make them. The strategic alliance is a third way.
Why? They are used when it is not practical to hire people.
As mentioned earlier in this symposium, there was a trend a
few years ago where many employees left big firms and formed a
little start-up firm, and then entered into a joint venture with a big
firm because the people in the little firm are going to be making all
of the money.3 It is hard, and maybe in many cases impossible, to
give a big company's employees the same compensation incentives
that a joint venture partner has. Therefore the option of making
goods is not practical. And on the other side - we heard references
to this earlier - the market contract does not work in situations
where the nature of the required performances is too complex or
too contingent to be spelled out in a contract. 4 At the same time,
lawyers often feel uneasy when a contract specifies that the per-
formance required on one side is to use "best efforts." What does
that mean? How are you going to monitor that to prove it? But it
is not an uncommon feature. Of course, what it means is that en-
2 See Edward Berstein, Law and Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Con-
tracts: A Contract Lawyer's View of the Law and Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REV. 189,
235-36 (1995).
3 See Stephen Fraidin, Remarks at the George A. Leet Business Law Symposium, The
Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances 15-16 (Oct. 4, 2002) (transcript available from the Case
Western Reserve Law Review).
4 See Susan R. Helper, Governing Alliances: Advancing Knowledge and Controlling
Opportunism, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 929, 933-34 (2003).
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forcement is not a realistic possibility. You have to rely on trust
and cooperation and a structure that is conducive to using best ef-
forts, as opposed to relying on an ability to sue for damages for
breach. Therefore, it follows that alliance agreements are often
quite vague. Each party's duties are so vague and complex that it
is often impossible for a party to detect and prove to a court that
the other side is not meeting its obligations.
Accordingly, in alliances parties cannot rely on the usual
means to enforce the contract, but must instead rely on trust, which
has to be cultivated before the parties can even enter into an alli-
ance, and which has to be preserved and even enhanced if the alli-
ance is to realize maximum profits. The obligations of trust and
cooperation cannot be spelled out. These are difficult concepts for
lawyers, who are trained to get everything in writing. How does a
lawyer draft trust and cooperation into a contract? Either you
don't at all, or you put the terms in - and they can be very useful
since people like to think of themselves as abiding by their prom-
ises. So, if you put in provisions that say, "We'll use best efforts
and we will act in a cooperative way," they indeed have some in-
fluence, even though they are basically unenforceable.
The hard bargaining over details so admired by lawyers
erodes the trust and cooperation that the parties want to nurture.
Steve Fraidin mentioned the talks among the business people be-
fore the lawyers get involved.5 Those discussions often include
dining together, playing golf together, drinking together, and try-
ing to avoid unpleasant disputes. Then the lawyers enter and say,
"All right, what are we going to do about this clause here. This is
unacceptable. We need to revise this." What happens to all the
trust and the buddy-buddy relationship that the parties have been
trying to cultivate? How can lawyers make clients happy?
First, consult carefully about what your client wants and how
the client wants to achieve it. A lot of lawyers are like the driver
who is lost but refuses to ask directions because asking for direc-
tions might make you look foolish. If you are in litigation and you
are representing the plaintiff, you do not say to the plaintiff,
"What's your objective here?" If you did, the client might answer:
"The objective is to win the suit and get as much money as I can,
obviously. Why are you asking me such a stupid question?" But
in the context of a strategic alliance the goal is not so obvious, so a
lawyer should not be embarrassed to say to the client, "Let's talk
about what your objectives are here." Again, the parties want to
5 Stephen Fraidin & Radu Lelutiu, Strategic Alliances and Corporate Control, 53 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 865 (2003).
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create a relationship of trust and confidence, so as the lawyer you
need to discuss with the client what the client's goals are and what
parameters there are in terms of the negotiations in order to create
and maintain that relationship.
One expert has said the first rule of outside counsel is to know
your client. In this respect - with apologies to Steve Fraidin, who
objected to the comparison 6 
- the strategic alliance is something
like a marriage, and the lawyer in the alliance may be compared to
a lawyer in a prenuptial agreement. Couples who want a prenup-
tial agreement differ about what issues they want the agreement to
cover. If somebody just says to you "draft a prenuptial agree-
ment," you'd say, "it's not a standard form contract. I'd have to
sit down and talk with the clients. Why do you want this and what
do you want to cover?" The same thing is true with an alliance.
Trust is not an all-or-nothing quality. It comes in shades of
gray and changes over time. Partners in alliances often start small
with the hope of expanding their cooperation if trust in each other
is vindicated. This is something sociologists talk about as a way
of developing trade in primitive cultures. How do you deal with
another tribe that is unknown to you? You start small with some
little trades, and if that works out, you move on to bigger ones.
Similarly, partners in alliances often start small and hope to ex-
pand. You cannot know what your client wants unless you know
what level of trust the parties already have. What is your past rela-
tionship with these people? What is your feeling about them?
What is your basis for trust in them? Do you know them from the
industry? Is this a close-knit industry in which people care about
their reputation? Is this a firm that has a reputation that it wants to
preserve? Or is it a start-up firm that may not have any reputation
and may not much care about what reputation it develops?
Again, lawyers tend to assume that clients want them to bar-
gain hard over details. That's what lawyers usually do. Also it's
natural for lawyers to get involved in a matter and want to justify
being there. Why am I sitting at the table? What is my purpose?
My purpose is to bargain hard over details. But in the context of
strategic alliances, that may not be what the clients want. In many
cases if the lawyer does not bargain hard, she is considered to be a
"chump." "Here we are bargaining hard, and the other guy's not
saying anything. She's not much of lawyer." But in the context of
an alliance it may be that the hard charging, hard bargaining law-
yer is not what the client is looking for. To put it another way, the
956 [Vol. 53:953
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role of the hired gun is not really appropriate in many cases here.
The goal is to obtain the mutual satisfaction of the parties. That
doesn't necessarily mean splitting the difference where goals con-
flict. As business people point out, to divide the baby in half often
leaves both sides feeling compromised. Negotiators, including the
lawyers, should try to find out what issues are important to each
side and see if they can get what their clients want and what is im-
portant to their clients, while at the same time, giving the other
side what is important to them.
The parties should seek creative win-win solutions that ex-
pand the total pie. In his valuable book, Trusted Partners, Jordan
Lewis quotes one veteran: "The attorneys on the other side and I
see each other as partners, facilitating a mutually beneficial busi-
ness arrangement.",7 To go back to the model of the litigator,
you're fighting over a pie with a fixed size. The only way I can
get a larger slice is to take it away from you, and the only way you
can get a larger slice is to take it away from me. But in the context
of an alliance, it may well be that the transaction can produce ei-
ther a larger or a smaller pie. Therefore, lawyers should think
about how they can structure a transaction that will produce a lar-
ger pie and, therefore, a larger slice for each participant. In some
cases that may require offering the other side concessions it hasn't
even requested. Partners in strategic alliances often differ widely
in their sophistication and bargaining power. The usual attitude of
lawyers in that situation is: "We've got bargaining power over
these people. Well we're going to exploit it to the hilt." In the
context of an alliance, though, the objective is not to get the most
attractive deal on paper, but to get the maximum contribution from
the other side. To do that it may be wise not merely to accede to
certain demands by the other side, but perhaps even to suggest
them. Again, if we use the model of marriage, sometimes it can
pay dividends to do something nice even when you're not expected
to do it.
There was discussion earlier in the symposium about flexibil-
ity.8 We all know what happens in the evolution of legal docu-
ments. They get longer over time. The ability to spot issues and
to draft precise clauses to cover a myriad of contingencies is a
point of pride for many lawyers. You take what was an eighty-
page document in the last deal and make it an eighty-five-page
7 JORDAN D. LEWIS, TRUSTED PARTNERS: How COMPANIES BUILD MUTUAL TRUST AND
WIN TOGETHER 262 (1999).
8 Sanjiv K. Kapur, Structuring and Negotiating International Joint Ventures: Anecdotal
Evidence from a Large Law Firm Practice, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 937 (2003).
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document by adding some provisions to cover something that no
one thought of last time. In many contexts, such work may be the
mark of a great lawyer, but in strategic alliances, parties often pre-
fer simple contracts. For one, they're cheaper to draft. Simpler
contracts also provide greater flexibility. By contrast, proposing
detailed terms may provoke suspicion that you're not going to try
to work problems out cooperatively, but you're going to stand on
your contractual rights. The reaction of the other side is often:
"Wait a second. I thought we were going to be buddy-buddy here
and you're haggling over the details of the contract. Does that
mean you're going to look for every opportunity to drag this into
court? That's not the kind of relationship we have in mind."
It was mentioned earlier that most alliances end in divorce,
usually in a few years. 9 The reasons vary, but they often involve
opportunism. Therefore, a client is justified being wary of the
other side. On the one hand, you can't assume an adversarial rela-
tionship. But on the other hand, you can't assume a buddy-buddy
relationship. In these situations people often use the phrase "cal-
culative trust," which is based on a determination that your partner
has a strong self-interest in performing in good faith. For exam-
ple, a party cooperates because it wants future business with the
partner or because it wants to maintain its reputation, especially in
a close-knit industry. Of course, if such factors are absent, there
may be less reason to trust the other parties. As always, the lawyer
has to ask the client what reason there is to think that the other side
is going to perform in good-faith and use its best efforts. Will a
concern for its reputation cause the other side to perform in good
faith? Or are such factors absent so that the lawyer will have to
draft it into the contract?
The scope of the lawyer's advice may depend on the sophisti-
cation of the client. Consider the line between business questions
and legal questions. If your client is a large firm that has a lot of
experience with alliances, the client will know what they want and
will be able to tell you in reasonable detail what they want. On the
other hand, if the client is a start-up company without much so-
phistication in legal matters and with no experience in alliances or
any other kind of transaction, then the lawyer may have to serve in
a much broader capacity, such as providing business advice as well
as technical legal advice.
The substantive terms of an agreement are just as important as
the negotiation demeanor used to reach an agreement. The two,
9 Id.
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however, are closely related. For instance, the calculative trust
used in negotiations may depend heavily on the substantive terms
of the contract. Of course, the first question - on which the attor-
ney may or may not be consulted - is whether to enter into the
strategic alliance at all. Rachelle Sampson spoke about this and
the need to not assume that an alliance is always the best arrange-
ment to enter into.10 It may be that some kind of service or pur-
chase contract would be a better arrangement in a particular situa-
tion.
In addition, there is always the option of foregoing an alliance
and making the desired goods or creating the desired service in-
house. If another firm has something you want, some technology
you want, maybe you can just purchase it from them. If they have
some employees you want, hire them. If you do not want just part
of the company, acquire the whole company and do not bother
with an alliance. In fact, many alliances are in effect trial mar-
riages that culminate, if things go well, with one firm acquiring the
other. But the parties often want to get to know each other before
stepping to the altar. And in many cases you don't want an entire
firm but only part of it, or it is impractical to the give the employ-
ees the same material incentives that an independent firm perhaps
can in an alliance.
The parties must choose what form the entity should take.
The choice may be important for reasons of tax treatment, fiduci-
ary duties, and legal liability of the partners. For example, many
alliances are referred to as joint ventures. A true joint venture is
generally treated in law as a partnership, though, in fact, many so-
called joint ventures are incorporated and therefore treated as cor-
porations. Recall that a partnership is defined as an association of
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for
profit. 1 So, if you have a sharing of control and profit, you may
have partnership even if you call your arrangement a dealership, a
distributorship, or something else. How will your income be allo-
cated? For instance, division of profits may be the most important
factor to deter one partner from forcing an opportunistic dissolu-
tion. In addition, it may be wise to give one partner a liquidation
preference on some or all of the alliance assets.
There are questions at every stage. For instance, if the entity
will incur losses, as is common at the start of a project, how will
10 Rachelle C. Sampson, The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances, 53 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 909, 925 (2003).
1 UNIF. P'SHIP. ACT § 6(1) (1914); 6 U.L.A. 256 (1995); UNIF. P'SHIP. ACT § 101(6)
(amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 2001).
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the resulting tax deduction be divided? Remember that to maxi-
mize the client's profit the lawyer needs to give the other side the
right incentives. So, for example, in franchises it is usually the
franchisee who gets the lion's share of the variable income. The
franchiser sells the product at a fairly fixed price. Why is that?
Because the franchisee has more influence over the sales from
each franchise. You try to place the incentives with the partner
who has the most influence over the outcome. Remember that an
apparently attractive profit sharing clause is of little use if the
other party can back out on terms unfavorable to your client. Also,
termination provisions haunt the income sharing provisions and all
other contract clauses.
The scope of the alliance can be narrow or broad. One writer
says this issue triggers more disputes than any other.12 A broad
scope may prevent a partner from pursuing profitable opportunities
alone or with third parties while a narrow scope invites a party to
usurp benefits that should be shared with the partner. An example
of the latter would be one firm taking technology developed by the
partner for one purpose and using it for another purpose without
sharing the profits. Drafting to address such problems can be dif-
ficult. How can you define the scope, for example, of a research
and development joint venture when you can't be sure what results
the venture will produce? It is very common for research that be-
gins with one objective to discover technology that is useful in
some other way. How do you contract for that, when by definition
you don't know what the results are going to be?
Also, the ideal provision may change over time. For example,
suppose one partner enters into a new line of business. A lawyer
would now have to revise the alliance contract to take that into ac-
count and decide if the new line of business is within the scope of
the venture or is not, and, therefore, is or is not within the scope of
the fiduciary duties.
What about governance? Who calls the shots here? Even if
one party has general control, there are ways of softening the ef-
fects of this so that the party cannot abuse its power. For example,
the controlling party may agree to consult with a junior partner
before taking specified steps. Of course, an obligation to consult,
technically, does not limit the controlling partner's power. But as
a practical matter, if people are required to consult with somebody
else they tend to be more reasonable and more cooperative.
12 Steven I. Glover, Negotiating and Structuring Joint Ventures: Lessons from Manage-
ment Consultants, M & A LAWYER, Mar. 1998, at 1, 7.
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There is some evidence that fifty-fifty joint ventures tend to
be more successful than others. That is not surprising. I think
equality is easier to deal with than domination of one party by the
other. But, of course, equality in regards to control raises the spec-
ter of disagreement and deadlock. How can a lawyer deal with
that? An obvious solution is arbitration. But as was mentioned
earlier in the symposium,' 3 although arbitration is not as divisive
as litigation, it is hardly a sign of a really good relationship. Other
than that what can you do? Some people like to provide for man-
datory good faith bargaining before a lawsuit can be filed or arbi-
tration is demanded. Again, this does not guarantee that the bar-
gaining will lead to anything, but if there is a requirement that
people sit down and talk to each other before they can demand ar-
bitration, there is some tendency for that to lead to better results.
In many situations it is common to have a neutral third party as
part of the regular governance structure. For example, in strategic
investments, the kind Steve Fraidin talked about this morning,14 or
in venture capital investments, it is common to have a board com-
prised of a couple of representatives from the investor; and a cou-
ple of representatives from the insiders, the managers; and neutral
directors. Neutral directors can serve as tiebreakers, but their
more important function is to act as facilitators. Neutral directors
can encourage the two sides to be reasonable, to discuss things,
and to be imaginative in trying to reach good results.
How does a lawyer maintain good relations? A lawyer can
provide for regular contact between the parties. It is a good idea if
the parties do this anyway, but there is no reason why a lawyer
cannot put that in the contract. If relations in the alliance will not
naturally be handled by the highest officers of the companies, pro-
vide for periodic consultation between the high officers of the
companies. One reason for failure among alliances is a sense of
the people involved in the alliance that the higher-ups aren't inter-
ested in it - i.e., that they don't have a commitment to the venture.
A provision that the higher-ups will be involved and will consult
with each other regularly means you are less likely to run into that
problem.
I have already mentioned the importance of termination provi-
sions, and one of the best guarantors of harmonious governance is
that neither party sees any benefit in pulling out. Such provisions
are important since a true joint venture is a partnership that under
13 Symposium, The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 857
(2003).
14 Fraidin & Lelutiu, supra note 5, at 870-71.
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the Uniform Partnership Act may be dissolved by any partner at
any time, thereby triggering an auction of partnership assets.' 5
This opens up the possibility of opportunism; for instance, if one
partner is unable to make a bid of the fair value of the assets, the
other partner may be able to grab the assets of the venture at a bar-
gain price.
To prevent such behavior, the lawyer must be aware of termi-
nation provisions. Such provisions can take many forms. For in-
stance, if both parties are well-financed, you can have something
like a Russian Roulette buy-out. That is, if a partner says it wants
out, it must announce a value for the whole venture. The other
side then has a choice. It can either buy out the partner who is
terminating, or it can sell its interest to the partner who is terminat-
ing at the announced value. This is a variation on the classic way
to divide a pie equally: have one person divide the pie, and then
let the other person choose his piece. But, again, this works well
only if the parties are well-financed. It does not work if one can-
not afford to buy out the other. Of course the lawyer wants provi-
sions that discourage opportunistic dissolution, but not necessarily
all dissolution. You may have a situation, for example, in which
one of the partners feels that the deal is unfair, that the other side
is not cooperating and, yet, harsh termination provisions have that
party locked into the deal and so that it cannot get out.
I said earlier that many business people and many lawyers
think that lawyers often perform poorly in strategic alliances. How
did we get into this mess, and how do we get out of it? The prob-
lem begins with law schools. Actually, it may begin before law
school because in the media, in the movies, and on TV, the lawyer
is always an aggressive adversary - i.e., a hired gun.
And what happens when students arrive at law school? Al-
most all first year courses are litigation oriented. And even to the
extent that one encounters transactional courses in law school,
there is still a tendency to be suspicious and say: "Watch out. The
other side is probably trying to take advantage of you, so be care-
ful. And, of course, bargain hard for your client, get the best pos-
sible deal you can." So, it is not surprising that when students
emerge from law school and go into practice, they are bewildered
by a client who says, "we are trying to cultivate a relationship of
trust and confidence here, and everything you are doing is destroy-
ing that."
15 UNIF. P'SHIP. Acr § 31(I)(b) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 771 (1995).
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What can law schools do about this? We should pay more at-
tention to cooperative negotiation, including knowing when it is
appropriate and when it is not. More generally, we should pay
more attention to the transactional side of the law. We can also
use a little help from the bar. Here at Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity we have created a set of concentrations that a student can
choose, one of which is in business organizations. We are trying
to get students to pay more attention to their curriculum. One dif-
ficulty we encounter is that students know that most employers
don't care much about what courses students take. Generally, em-
ployers care about two things: (1) What law school did you go
to?; and (2) What was your GPA? It's somewhat understandable
that employers would have this attitude. Knowledge, employers
can teach you; brainpower, they can't. And we use GPA as a
proxy for brainpower. On the other hand, with clients becoming
more demanding about billings and with firms becoming more re-
luctant to hire students who require a couple of years before they
can do any useful work, maybe it makes sense now for employers
to pay more attention to what students have taken in law school.
A last point, to be a little provocative: we hear constantly in
academia these days that diversity is a strength. Well, one thing
you learn in reading about trust, especially in sociology and eco-
nomics, is that this is baloney. I believe people tend to trust others
that are like themselves and to distrust those who are different
from themselves. Diversity is an obstacle to trust that has to be
overcome.
The problem in proclaiming that diversity is a strength is not
just that it is false, but that it diverts us from what we ought to be
doing. If we acknowledge that diversity is an obstacle, then we
can talk about the many known ways of dealing with that obstacle.
But, we can hardly address the problem if we refuse to acknowl-
edge that diversity is an obstacle.
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